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The system of indirect taxation in Spain is undergoing 
major reforms in order to comply with European 
Community Harmonisation standards and also as a means 
of revenue adjustment for the Treasury. The 
availability of data on household budget surveys allows 
the estimation of an Almost Ideal Demand System with 
which we simulate the impact of two hypothetical tax 
reforms on the welfare of Spanish households, patterns 
of demand and tax revenue.
1 Fundacion Empresa Publica y U.N.E.D.
2 European University Institute and Universitat Pompeu 























































































































































































The impact of changes in the system of indirect taxation 
within E.C. countries has been an issue of interest for quite a 
few years, especially given the emphasis which the European 
Commission has placed on the harmonisation of VAT rates as a 
prior step towards the creation of a single market.
The study of the impact of such harmonisation on Spanish 
households was the original motivation for this research. Upon 
E.C. membership in 1986, the existing system of indirect taxation 
was replaced by V.A.T., which was set at 12%, 6% and 33% for the 
standard, reduced and luxury rates respectively. Since then the 
government has changed the standard rate to 15% (via an 
intermediate change to 13%) and in January 1993, a new rate of 3% 
for articles of first necessity will be proposed to the 
Parliament.
There are three basic policy issues associated to these and 
similar changes. First, the impact on households' welfare. 
Second, the potential change in consumption patterns which might 
be itself a policy objective as is the case with environmental 
taxes. And finally, the effects on Treasury revenue and on 
inflation. While the third of these issues can be addressed by 
means of forecasting devices based on aggregate estimations (see 
Burgos et.al. [1992]), knowledge at the micro level is needed to 
obtain an accurate picture of who, and by how much, are the 
losers (or even winners) after a fiscal reform and of the 
potential changes in the structure of demand.
The availability of data on expenditure at the household 
level for Spain offers the possibility of obtaining a simulation 
device with which to tackle the three questions above. Such a 
device consists of a system of equations explaining how 
households allocate expenditure to different consumption 
categories as a function of price, income and demographic 
characteristics on which the effect of price can be simulated.
The structure of this paper is the following. In section 2, 
we present the overall framework of consumer behaviour in which 
our demand system is cast. Then a convenient functional form for 
such a demand system is introduced in section 3. The advantages 
of using microdata are debated in section 4 and the econometric 
treatment is explained in section 5, where estimates of the model 
are presented. Section 6 is devoted to an explanation of the 
simulation methodology for both welfare and revenue. A 
presentation of the consequences for welfare and revenue for two 
reforms concludes the paper.
Many of the properties of the data we use are discussed 
along with some econometric or theoretical issues. A 
complementary account can be found in appendix 1. Appendix 2 




























































































In this section we provide a picture of the main features 
of the modelling exercise in terms of separability assumptions 
and choice of consumption goods.
We shall be concerned with the modelling of expenditure on 
non-durable goods. At the micro level, it is difficult to devise 
a model for the consumption of durable goods. Most existing 
literature usually addresses the rate of usage of such goods 
and/or the decision to own them separately3. The studies that 
address these two issues jointly require single commodity 
sophisticated modelling and rely on the existence of rich data4.
Including durable goods within our demand system would prove 
to be a very difficult task even if we could count with an 
appropriate model. Our data source does only collect information 
on purchases during reference periods of up to one quarter. In 
these circumstances, not only does recorded expenditure on cars, 
housing or appliances not measure the flow of services that those 
goods yield but even ownership cannot be identified due to the 
incidence of zero records from infrequency of purchase.
We also exclude tobacco and petrol from our system. Previous 
experience from Spanish data (Labeaga, [1991]) suggests that 
these two expenditure categories follow a peculiar consumption 
pattern in the sense that a proportion of households do not 
consider them as items of consumption because the household is 
non-smoking and/or the household does not own a car. In the 
absence of qualitative information about these characteristics, 
these two goods are best treated in a single equation context.
Thus we assume expenditure on the remaining non-durable 
goods to be weakly separable from the rest of expenditure 
decisions. Preferences are weakly separable if the direct utility 
function can be written in the following form (see Phlips [1974])
U(x1, .... x.,) -F [ (L\ (q1) . . . , Uk (<?„)]) ; (1)
2. Modelling framework.
or equivalently, if the marginal rate of substitution between any 
two goods belonging to the same group is independent of the level 
of consumption of goods outside the group. This can be shown to 
imply5 that the allocation of expenditure amongst items of one 
particular group is made without reference to prices or 
quantities outside the group. Such allocation depends only on 
outlay going to the group under consideration and the relative 
prices of its components.
3 See Baker et al. ( 1988, 1989) and Baker and Blundell
(1991).
4 See Dubin and McFadden (1984) and King (1980).




























































































Weak separability justifies the use of the concept of 
two-stage budgeting (see figure 1). The latter refers to the idea 
of agents allocating expenditure amongst broad groups first and 
then to commodities within each of those groups in a sequential 
process.
It should be said that while econometrically convenient, 
this assumption is in some ways restrictive for it is unlikely 
that durable expenditure decisions, (or even labour supply 
decisions) bear no substitution effects on expenditure on 
transport or leisure goods, as a good deal of empirical evidence 
suggests (see Blundell and Walker [1982] Browning and Meghir 
[1991] and Atkinson and Stern [1980]).
Figure l.Two stage budgeting. We shall be estimating the circled stage, i.e. the allocation of 
expenditure on non durable goods amongst its sub groups.
A possible alternative would be to estimate expenditure on 
non-durable goods conditional on durable tenure decisions (and/or 
on labour supply) . The advantages of this methodology are laid 
out in Browning and Meghir [1991]. For the purposes of our 
analysis, we would simply get around the unrealistic assumption 
of weak separability6 without modelling explicitly the 
determination of the conditioning variables. Unfortunately, as 
mentioned above, our data source does not contain information on 
tenure of durable goods, it only records whether there has been 
some expenditure on those commodities within the reference 
period. Therefore we cannot use the conditional approach and are 
forced to invoke weak separability. The process of allocation of 
expenditure will consist in a first stage where savings, labour 
supply and durable goods tenure are determined and a second stage
6 Because we would let the MRS of non durable goods depend 




























































































where the remaining expenditure is split between a range of 
non-durable categories.
This whole process can be viewed within a life-cycle consistent 
framework in which preferences are intertemporally separable. 
Current demands are expressed as a function of a variable that 
reflects past decisions and future anticipations of economic 
circumstances. In our analysis such a variable is current 
expenditure and the influence of the past and expectations about 
the future can be inserted in the model by letting the first 
stage of the process depend on interest rates, lagged prices, 
unemployment indicators and other macroeconomic variables (see 
Blundell [1988 ])7.
There remains the question of which commodity groupings 
should be chosen. When defining broad categories of goods, we 
make use of weak separability again; once expenditure has been 
allocated to the group "food”, the marginal rate of substitution 
between milk and bread will not be affected by consumption of any 
item in the broad group "clothing and footwear", say, 
interactions between groups are exclusively income effects. 
Therefore, one rule to be followed is always to keep items 
bearing either substitution or complementarity with one another 
always in the same group. For the moment, we seek to isolate 
groups of particular policy interest. Attending to this rule and 
to the current structure of indirect taxes in Spain, we choose 
the following categories: food and non-alcoholic beverages, 
alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear, fuel for housing, 
household non durable goods, public transport, and a residual 
category collecting the remaining non durable expenditure (see 
also appendix 2).
7 Criticisms of this intertemporal separability approach are 
based on the fact that the potential effects of habits are ruled 
out. Also, to some extent, this static representation has been 
blamed for rejections of homogeneity, because consumers might 





























































































One of the innovations of this research with respect to 
previous demand studies of Spanish data is the fact that we 
estimate a demand system with flexible price responses. The need 
to do so and the chosen functional form are discussed below.
What we might expect from our demand system is the ability 
to obtain a realistic picture of the substitution, own price and 
income effects that may arise after a change in the structure of 
relative prices. In this sense, some forms of preferences can 
only be a second best option for our analysis. In particular, to 
use \
additively separable preferences, that is
U(g1...g„)=F[^aC;.(gJ] (2)
would imply that cross-price derivatives are proportional to 
income derivatives in such a way that the factor of 
proportionality is independent of the good whose response we want 
to measure (see Phlips [1974]). This can be shown to exclude the 
possibility of negative expenditure elasticities and negative 
substitution effects, thus inferior goods and complementarity are 
ruled out a priori and clearly this is too strong an economic 
assumption to impose on the data (see Deaton [1974]).
Previous exercises with Spanish data (see Labeaga and Lopez 
[1992]) have used the Linear Expenditure System (L.E.S.) which 
has also been extensively used in the demand-analysis literature 
ever since its creation by Stone (1954). One of its main 
attractions of this model is the ability to retrieve its 
parameters from small samples (most of its applications to recent 
dates have been aggregate data studies) without much price 
variation.
However, this model incorporates the undesirable additive 
separability properties alluded to previously. In particular, if 
concavity is to be preserved in the model, all marginal 
propensities to consume must be positive, therefore inferior 
goods are ruled out. Similarly, the parametric requirements of 
concavity makes cross-price elasticities always positive which 
means that all goods are forced to be substitutes (see Deaton and 
Muelbauer, 1980,a).
In this study we use the Almost Ideal Model (A.I.M.) of 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980,b). This is originated from an 
approximation to a cost function taking the form

































































































logP=a0+52t atlogp)c + l/2^k YulogP^ogPi? Y« = l/2 (Y‘« +Y V > ;
and x, p are total expenditure and prices respectively.
With the following theoretical restrictions:




where sy are compensated elasticities
There is a number of reasons why this is the most 
appropriate choice of functional form for the purposes of this 
study. Firstly, the preferences from which the A.I.M. is derived 
(see Deaton and Muellbauer [1980,a] for a discussion of PIGLOG 
preferences) do not embody additive separability and therefore 
permit flexible price responses. Also, its Engel curves belong to 
the Working-Leser form, i.e. linear in the logarithm of total 
expenditure and thus non-linear in expenditure. The theoretical 
reason why this is desirable is that linear Engel Curves (in 
expenditure) imply that marginal propensities to consume are 
constant and identical for all individuals so that every agent 
spends the same proportion out of every extra unit of income at 
all his levels of income and moreover, this spending pattern is 
the same for poor and rich households for every particular good. 
Apart from being theoretically unreasonable, this property has 
also been empirically rejected (see Blundell and Ray, 1984). 
Another consideration concerning flexibility is the rank of a 
demand system. This concept can be defined as the number of 
linearly independent functions of income entering individual 
Engel Curves (see Forni and Brighi [1990]). In this sense the 
A.I.M. is rank two and the L.E.S. is rank one. There is now a 
body of evidence pointing towards demand systems having rank 
three (see Lewbel 1991 for the non parametric case and Blundell 
et. al. 1990 for the A.I.M. case). A convenient extension to the 
standard model, for which we also present estimates to allow 
comparison, would be the following
wi“ai+Pj!ogx+(logx)2 + yljlogpj (7)
We will therefore be dealing with a functional form which 
precludes the imposition of a priori implausible price responses 





























































































In addition, the A.I.M. can be integrated back to a cost 






























































































Perhaps more important than the choice of functional form is 
the choice of data on which the model is estimated. There is not 
usually much of a choice here apart from aggregate data but in 
the case of Spain we also count on a series of cross sections of 
family budget surveys (see appendices 1 and 2). In this section 
we debate the advantages of using microdata.
The demand system is estimated on microdata exclusively and 
in our opinion this is desirable for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the size of aggregate data sets restricts the number of 
parameters that can be estimated6. This might be of no importance 
when we want to retrieve a single demand equation, but if we want 
to consider a wide range of commodities, the virtually unlimited 
number of degrees of freedom microdata sets offer makes a 
significant difference. Secondly, there is the problem of 
aggregation. The use of aggregate data to retrieve estimates of 
demand systems rests on the assumption that there exist functions 
which relate aggregate consumption to prices and aggregate 
expenditure or some index summarising the effects of the 
distribution of individual expenditures. The conditions under 
which such functions exist have been surveyed by Forni and Brighi 
(1990). As these authors point out, these conditions place 
restrictions on micro demand functions and these restrictions in 
many cases preclude the use of estimated demand systems for 
simulations in which a certain degree of flexibility in both 
price and expenditure responses needs to be attained. Systems 
derived from Gorman Polar Form cost functions, the L.E.S. for 
example, satisfy exact aggregation conditions because they 
display linear Engel Curves and these are assumed to have the 
same slope for all agents. Therefore aggregate consumption 
depends on aggregate expenditure regardless of the distribution 
of the latter amongst the population. This, as explained above, 
has very restrictive implications. On the other hand, members of 
the Price Independent Generalised Linear (see Muellbauer [1975]) 
family of preferences, a special case of which is the A.I.M. 
model, allow for exact aggregation without imposing such severe 
restrictions, because the effects on demand of the distribution 
of income are accounted for (see Deaton and Muellbauer [1980,a]). 
On the practical side, such effects must be retrieved from 
microdata, therefore the use of aggregate data to retrieve an 
A.I.M. would only be theoretically consistent if microdata was 
available too. Thirdly, the exclusion of demographic explanatory 
variables (which may be correlated with total expenditure and 
prices) makes difficult the separation of income-and-price 
effects from the effects of the former. In order to avoid this 
"aggregation bias" the use of microdata for our exercise is fully 
justified. 8
8 It is not unlikely to find aggregate data studies in which 
the number of equations is kept to a minimum in order to avoid 
running out of degrees of freedom. An example in the Spanish 




























































































We will, therefore, use a pool of cross-sections on family 
budget surveys. As mentioned in the introduction, details about 
sampling design and the nature of the collected information can 




























































































The theoretical advantages of microdata discussed above take 
their toll in terms of a specific economic treatment. In this 
section we discuss such treatment with regard to the theoretical 
restrictions for the demand system and the nature of the survey 
information.
The restrictions that ensure the integrability of demand 
equations back to utility or cost functions must be satisfied if 
our estimates are to be used for welfare analysis (equation no.7 
for the A.I.M.).
Adding-up is a cross-equation restriction that is 
immediately satisfied if Working-Leser type models are estimated 
with linear methods (see Deaton and Muellbauer [1980,a]). 
Homogeneity is a single-equation restriction and as such it can 
be imposed and checked using an F-test. Symmetry requires 
cross-equation restrictions. These can be imposed by means of a 
minimum-distance method such as the Chi-squared; this is a two 
step method whereby estimates satisfying the other 
single-equation restrictions are obtained at a first stage, 
together with their covariance matrix, which are used at a second 
stage to impose symmetry (see Blundell et. al, [1990]).
In principle, therefore, we could retrieve estimates using 
OLS on each equation and then impose symmetry. However, the use 
of microdata presents the problem of households recording zero 
expenditures even after aggregating into broad categories, and it 
is well known that when the dependent variable is censored or 
truncated, OLS yields biased estimates. Therefore it is crucial 
to treat the problem of zero records adequately and the first 
measure is to establish of the following which is their cause.
Zeroes might arise for any of the following reasons:
1. Because the household is maximising utility at zero 
consumption for its current budget (corner solution).
2. Because the household does not participate in the 
consumption of some commodity (the case of non-smoking households 
for instance).
3. Because no purchase has been made during the monitoring 
period although the household is a regular consumer of the good 
(infrequency of purchase).
The rotating-panel9 nature of the data we use can elucidate 
to some extent which of these reasons apply. The following table 
shows the proportion of positive expenditures on the categories 
we estimate after one quarter and after aggregating over eight 
quarters for the set of households which cooperate during eight 
quarters in the "Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares” (a 
total of 1123 out of 13711).
5. Econometric implementation.




























































































TABLE 1. PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS RECORDING POSITIVE 
EXPENDITURES ON EACH GOOD IN ONE QUARTER AND OVER EIGHT 
QUARTERS.
Category In one quarter. Over eight 
quarters.
Food and refreshments .994 .999
Alcoholic beverages .700 .951
Clothing and footwear .900 .990
Fuel for housing .990 1.00
Household non durable .780 .970
Public transport .460 .800
Other non durable 
goods
.780 .960
N.b. Table obtained from the 1123 households which 
collaborate over eight quarters.
The monitoring period for food, alcohol, household 
non-durable, public transport and other non-durable goods is 
one week. For fuel it is one month.
We note that the majority of households records a positive 
purchase for all categories over the eight quarters, with the 
exception of public transport, for which 20% of households 
remain with zero records. Given the monitoring periods at the 
bottom of the table, it is easy to infer that most of the zero 
records for these categories will be due to too short (relative 
to the average frequency of purchase) a monitoring period or to 
too long an interval between purchases for the affected 
households.
When infrequency of purchase is present, Keen (1987) has shown 
that OLS yields biased estimators because of the existence of 
correlation between the error term and the total expenditure 
regressor and that in order to overcome this problem total 
expenditure can be instrumented successfully with total income, 
which in principle should display less correlation with the error 
term since this variable is not affected by the decision to 
purchase.
Thus, the A.I.M. is estimated by three-stages least squares 
(which in this case is equivalent to two-stages least squares 
equation by equation because each equation contains the same 
variables on its right hand-side). We provide a number of 
exogenous variables ranging from total income to seasonal dummies 
and demographic characteristics which determine total non-durable 
expenditure in the first stage of the allocation of expenditure. 
Also, a number of important demographics are introduced into the 
model to help explain the budget shares.
The model is non-linear in its original form but one of the 
features that have made it popular is the relative ease with 




























































































Ever since the model's origins, the following approximation to 
log P in equation (6) has been used (see Deaton and Muellbauer 
[1980,a] or Blundell et al. [1990]).
logP=Y,kwKlo<3Pk (®)
In line with those previous studies, we will also apply the 
approximation, that is, we construct an Individual Stone Index to 
deflate expenditure10.
With respect to the imposition of theoretical restrictions 
the following points are relevant:
In order to avoid the singularity of the error variance 
matrix (because of the additivity of the system, any equation is 
a linear combination of the others), the last equation is left 
out in estimation and its parameters are retrieved from the 
adding-up restriction which, as mentioned before is satisfied 
automatically by linear estimators. The homogeneity restriction 
is imposed by entering all prices relative to that of the 
excluded good, and it is tested by means of a Fisher test against 
the unrestricted model, equation by equation, before imposing or 
testing symmetry.
Symmetry, which is a whole system restriction, is imposed by the 
minimum-distance method embodied in the SYSLIN procedure of SAS 
ETS econometric software and again tested by means of an 
F-test11.
5.1. Model estimates.
The following tables present the estimation results for the 
Almost Ideal model we use in the simulation analysis.
The first column in the tables contains the
homogeneity-restricted rank 2 model, and consequently the seventh 
price parameter is not estimated directly but can be calculated 
from the homogeneity restriction. The second column contains the 
symmetry-restricted price parameters. These are obtained by 
imposing the system-wide restriction on the 
homogeneity-restricted parameters. The third column contains the 
real expenditure term of the rank 3 model as well as two 
interactions between demographics and real expenditure for the 
purpose of comparison with the rank 2 version.
The parameters on the demographic and price variables for 
this version are statistically equivalent to those of the rank 2 
version and hence are omitted from the table.
10 We are aware of the possibility of introducing a bias 
when using this procedure. The problem reduces to a case of 
omitted-variables bias, as investigated by Pashardes (1992).
11 Since the resulting compensated elasticities vary for 





























































































R-squared values, the mean budget share and the F-statistic for 
the homogeneity restriction are supplied too. T-statistics are 
supplied within brackets.
The following variables are used to explain budget shares:
1. Constant shifters:
Number of children in the household.
Number of members in the household.
Number of earners of income in the household.
Age of the head of the household
Own Employment: Dummy activated if the head is
self-employed.
Unskilled: Dummy activated if the head is an unskilled
worker.
Not active: Dummy activated if the head is out of the labour 
force.
2. Slope:
Log of real expenditure and its square: natural logarithm of 
total expenditure deflated by the Stone index.
LP(food)...: natural logarithm of prices relative to the 
price of the seventh good.
3. Interactions with the expenditure term in rank 3 version: 
Child*lrx: Interaction of the number of children with log of 
real expenditure.





























































































TABLE A I.M.l FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC 3EVERAGES










Log real ex. -.128(37.0) .038(.56)





































































































TABLE A.I.M.2 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES










Log real ex. -.003(3.58) .0537(2.71)
" square - -.0032(3.32)
Child*lrx - .0017(1.79)
Age*lrx - .0000004(.06)
Log PI .0005(.14) .0131(4.8)

































































































TABLE A.I.M.3 CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR










Log real ex. .054(17.80) -.0370(.62)
" square - .005(1.82)
Child*lrx - -.0039(1.35)
Age*lrx - .00003(.18)
Log PI .024(2.32) .0371(4.74)
Log P2 -.070(1.48) -.048(1.64)
LP(clothing) .059(.34) .018(.16)
LP(fuel) -.018(.41) .004(.01)
LP(ndurable) . 101(1.17) .080(1.70)
LP(transpt.) . 106(2.25) .041(1.38)




























































































TABLE A.I.M.4 FUEL FOR DOMESTIC USE










Log real ex. -.0079 -.080(5.74) (2.93)
" square - .004(3.27)
Child*lrx _ .001(1.00)
Age*lrx _ -.0001(1.89)
Log PI -.0059 -.014(1.27) (3.97)
Log P2 -.015 -.0169(.747) (1.85)
LP(clothing) .0186 .004(.23) (.168)
LP(fuel) .0337 .028(1.69) (1.73)
LP(ndurable) -.008 -.008(.22) (.50)
LP(transpt.) .020 .060(.98) (5.9)




























































































TABLE A.I.M.5 HOUSEHOLD NON-DURABLE GOODS










Log real ex. .0236(14.37) -.016(-.50)
" square - .003(1.92)
Child*lrx - .004(3.40)
Age*lrx - -.0003(3.34)
Log PI .0189(3.42) .0128(2.87)

































































































TABLE A.I.M.6 PUBLIC TRANSPORT










Log real ex. .003(2.28) -.1018(3.82)
" square . .005(3.84)
Child*lrx - -.0011(.895)
Age*lrx - .0002(3.01)
Log PI -.002(.44) .004(1.13)





F(l,°o) test for Homogeneity= 7.17„>■,«: - -^— -------try after he




























































































TABLE A.I.M.7 OTHER NON-DURABLE GOODS














Log PI .015(1.10) -.12

































































































with respect to the rank 2 model we find that the homogeneity 
restriction cannot be rejected except for the case of public 
transport. This has to be interpreted with regard to the 
significance of the price parameters in the model.
It is generally accepted that with microdata samples the 
threshold of significance has to be raised proportionately with 
the number of observations. A commonly used criterion is that a 
critical value equal to the logarithm of the square root of the 
number of observations should be used (see e.g. Atkison et al.
[1989] ), which in our case is 3.05. In these circumstances only 
two parameters would appear to be significant in the food, 
household non-durable goods and public transport equations; one 
parameter in the alcohol and residual equations and none in the 
clothing and fuel equations. However, if we were to take the 
usual threshold of 2, we would find a substantial number of 
significant parameters. In all equations the price parameters are 
jointly significantly different from zero. We attribute the lack 
of significance of some parameters to the multicollinearity that 
can be detected in the price series during the time span of our 
sample (see appendix 2).
Therefore the acceptance of the homogeneity restriction should be 
treated with caution for it might be due to a lack of strong 
significance in some parameters or on the other hand it could be 
a sign of the adequacy of microdata to describe consumer 
behaviour consonant with other studies (see Blundell et al.
[1990] ).
The case of the test for symmetry however is of a clear 
rejection of the null hypothesis12. Thus we force this 
restriction upon the data in order to obtain integrability 
conditions.
The real expenditure parameters are well determined in all 
equations as we would expect given the amount of variation in 
expenditure within the sample.The effects of prices and real 
expenditure on each household are given by their respective 
elasticities according to the following expressions.
(9)
The following table presents such effects calculated at the mean 
of the sample together with results from other Spanish and 
European Studies for the sake of comparison.
12 The test statistic is F(15,°° )=17.97 against a critical 




























































































TABLE 2. EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES.
Category A.I.M. Other United France
This Spanish Kingdom (3)
study studies (2)
Food .76 .66 .53 .48
Alcohol .88 .92 1.30 n.a.
Clothing 1.32 1.15 1.05 1.16
Fuel .86 .85 .13 .59
H. non-dur. 1.49 n.a. n.a. 1.41
P . Transport 1.13 1.50 1.74 .80
Other goods 1.43 1.30 1.00 1.36
"H. non--dur" is short for household non-durable goods.
The figures under "other Spanish Studies” are taken from
Abadia (1985) .
Figures for the U.K. and France have been supplied by the
Institute for Fiscal Studies. London.
TABLE 3. OWN PRICE ELASTICITIES.
Category A.I.M. Other United France
This Spanish Kingdom
study studies
Food -.87 -.85 -.39
Alcohol -1.03 -.67 -1.02 n.a.
Clothing -.89 n.a. -.75 -.98
Fuel -.53 -.80 -.18 -.12
H. non-dur. .14 n.a. n.a. -.62
P. Transport -1.27 -.75 -.95 -.07
Other goods 1.43 n.a. -.15 -.49
n.a.
"H. non-dur" is short for household non-durable goods.
The figures under "Other Spanish studies" are taken from 
Rebollo (1983) .
Figures for the U.K. and France have been supplied by the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies. London.
Looking at expenditure elasticities, our study suggests that 
food, alcohol and fuel are necessity goods whereas clothing, 
household non-durable goods, public transport and other goods are 
luxuries. This matches the classification arising from the 
results of the previous Spanish study cited above. The pattern is 
similar to that of the U.K. except for alcohol, which seems to be 
a luxury in Britain. The results for France do not diverge much 
except for the case of public transport.
As far as price elasticities go, the pattern is similar to 
the U.K. and France in that food, fuel and clothing are 
relatively price inelastic but public transport seems to be more 
elastic in Spain. Our model displays two positive own-price 
elasticities, but it is easy to see that this might be a result 





























































































With respect to the effect of demographic variables, we find 
that children have a significant effect on the predicted share of 
several equations: for instance, one additional child increases 
the share of household non-durable goods by one percentage point. 
Every additional member increases the share of food by 2% and 
has a significant effect on the rest of expenditure categories. 
In the case of alcohol and household non-durable goods, one extra 
earner increases the share by nearly 5% of its mean. The age of 
the head has a significant positive impact in the case of food, 
fuel, household non durable goods and a negative one in the case 
of alcohol, clothing and public transport.The effect of 
self-employment is to increase spending by approximately 10% of 
the mean share in the case of fuel and household non durable 
goods and it decreases the predicted share by 25% of the mean in 
the case of public transport. Unskilled workers spend 20% 
percent more out of total expenditure on alcohol, 10% more on 
clothing and fuel, 15% more on household non durable goods, 36% 
less on public transport and roughly 10% less on the residual 
category than the base household. Being out of the labour market 
only has a significant impact for expenditure on household 
non-durable goods, for which it increases the predicted share by 
approximately 10% of the mean share with respect to the base 
household.
With respect to the appropriateness of the rank 3 model, we 
find that the parameters on the squared log of real expenditure 
term are significantly different from zero (on the above 
criterion) in the case of alcohol, fuel and public transport. It 
would also be possible to use a rank 3 model for revenue and 
welfare simulation since a cost function is available in the work 
of Banks et. al. (1992). However, we choose to use the rank 2 
model for the current exercise leaving experiments with the rank 
3 version for subsequent research.
Having estimated a complete demand system, we now proceed to 





























































































The next sections describe the methodology of the tax 
simulation routine and present the results for two tax reforms 
which we consider of particular interest. The first reform 
consists in a projected tax scenario for 199313, which we 
envisage as an increase in two percentage points for the standard 
VAT rate at 12% and an increase in 3 points for the reduced rate 
at 6%. The second reform is defined as revenue neutral, that is, 
we find a single tax rate which, if levied on every good, yields 
the same revenue as in the initial situation. Since we do not 
include goods with the special rate at 33%, we deal only with 
reduced and standard rates. For the current analysis we ignore 
excise duties since they affect only alcohol out of our seven 
categories. The following table outlines the two VAT reforms.
TABLE 4. CHANGE IN RATES FOR THE SIMULATED REFORMS.
Category Initial
rate.
Reform 1 Reform 2
Food and refreshments 6% 9% 9%
Alcoholic beverages 12% 14% 9%
Clothing and footwear 12% 14% 9%
Fuel for housing 12% 14% 9%
Household non-durable 12% 14% 9%




6.1 Definition of the reforms.
The basic assumption in this study and similar ones (see 
Baker et al. [1990]) about how taxes affect consumers is that 
supply is perfectly inelastic and therefore retail prices fully 
reflect changes in taxes.
The treatment of the excluded goods in this simulation 
consists in assuming that their pre-reform level of expenditure 
remains fixed. The alternative would be to assume that it is the 
quantity that remains fixed and consequently the total 
expenditure on the categories in our system would be affected.
13 As mentioned in the introduction, 1993 rates will be of 
15% and 6% (standard and reduced respectively) with the 
possibility of a super-reduced rate for food subject to 
parliamentary approval. This has only recently been made public, 




























































































Thus, tax reforms can be defined as the following linear mapping 
of the budget set (expenditure allocated to non-durable goods and 
prices) for every household
<yS'P'Myl.pV} (10)
Let p° be the pre reform retail price of the ith good, then 
it can be expressed as
Pi”( l+v°)qi-qi~qv°; (12)
where v%,qi are the initial VAT rate and the net of tax price
of good i. Therefore, if v± is the new tax rate, the after tax 
price is given by
p!=(i+vi )<?i; (ig)
Or
Pi =P ° ; (16)
where
APi = <Ji(W-Vi°) = (V--V°) _ , , , , ,
p° (i+v° Jg'i i+v“
therefore
Pi =Pi -( V Ì-
1+vï
-+Pi ; (18)
It is clear that this way of modelling the effect of taxes 
on prices is open to many criticisms since, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no theoretical nor empirical argument why 
suppliers may not absorb part of the tax increase. In the absence 





























































































The issue we consider as far as the welfare implications of 
the tax reforms are concerned is the money metric impact of the 
price changes on households, in particular, we calculate the 
equivalent gain for every household. This concept is defined as 
the amount of money that the household would have paid (or 
accepted) in order to remain at the initial level of utility with 
the final set of prices. This is easily computable since we have 
an estimated cost function14. First we calculate equivalent 
income which is implicitly defined as:
v(Pr,ye)^v(p,y);
where:
v(.)~ indirect utility; (19)
p r is a reference price vector; 
thus inverting:
ye=c(v,pr)=c(pr,p,y);
6.2. Welfare and revenue simulation.
that is, the level of budget which at the reference price level 
(initial price level in our case) is equivalent in terms of 
utility to the actual budget of the household at the final 
prices.
For the A.I.M. cost function, equivalent income is given by:
i°gy.=ao+E t a*i°gp*+i/2Et E, Y*ji°gp*i°gp/+
nr (20)
a  < 4r  ) N i ° g y - a „ - E ,  a *l 0gp *-1/ 2E t E ,  Y *,iogp*iogpj),•Vk
Then equivalent gain for any household is naturally
EG^YZ-yH
where yS is initial expenditure;
( 21 )
Concerning the particularities of revenue simulation, the 
first step consists in calculating the new predicted budget 
shares using the parameter estimates of the rank 2 Almost Ideal 
Model and the new prices. When doing this, we must take into 
consideration the fact that the model does not predict shares in 
a perfect manner. In these circumstances there is not a clear 
preference for using predicted shares against observed shares 
when calculating the new levels of revenue. Since we are 
interested in price and real expenditure effects, we opt for 
separating these components from the overall expenditure on each 
commodity and then inserting their calculated new effect in the 
part of expenditure explained by demographic characteristics 
(which are not affected by the reform) and the stochastic
































































































that is, the part of each share not explained by prices and real 
expenditures or equivalently, the component of the share 
explained by household characteristics, geographical, seasonal 
and other non-price and non-real expenditure variables plus the 
residual.



























































































Thus, the post-reform shares are defined as
" M E j Yijl o g P j+Pi l o 9-^Tl+e i ; (23)
Once the new shares have been computed, the levels of 
revenue from every household are calculated according to the 
following expression
Vi (2 4)
where El is the post-reform level of expenditure on the iw
category and U )
vl*l/





























































































The following charts contain the simulation results in 1989 
pesetas per quarter by deciles of expenditure and by a 
demographic breakdown. The first two columns in each table show 
the pattern of observed expenditures and the rest of columns show 
the increase in tax payment after the changes in behaviour 




























































































TABLE SIM.l. FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 40112 63.2 1039 1.63 1059 1.67
2 68220 61.8 1770 1.60 1804 1.63
3 86255 58.9 2241 1.53 2285 1.56
4 101576 56.9 2641 1.48 2693 1.51
5 117852 56.3 3066 1.46 3127 1.49
6 130424 53.4 3398 1.39 3465 1.41
7 149677 52.2 3903 1.36 3979 1.38
8 167201 49.3 4367 1.28 4450 1.31
9 188523 45.2 4934 1.18 5028 1.20
10 253868 36.8 6691 .97 6789 .98
Retired 99459 52.0 2599 1.36 2639 1.38
0 Children 131476 47.3 3435 1.23 3500 1.25
1 " 145099 48.3 3788 1.26 3862 1.28
2 " 1436% 47.9 3752 1.25 3824 1.27
3 " 160698 48.3 4208 1.26 4282 1.28
4 " 185875 55.8 4850 1.45 4932 1.48
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIM.2. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 1862 2.93 25 .04 -45 .07
2 3014 2.73 40 .03 -73 .06
3 4623 3.15 62 .04 -112 .07
4 5446 3.05 72 .04 -131 .07
5 7156 3.42 96 .04 -172 .08
6 7995 3.27 106 .04 -191 .07
7 9518 3.32 128 .04 -227 .07
8 10536 3.11 142 .04 -250 .07
9 12536 3.00 173 .04 -295 .07
10 20309 2.95 291 .04 -476 .06
Retired 5985 3.13 82 .04 -144 .07
0 Children 8737 3.14 121 .04 -207 .07
1 " 9696 3.23 132 .04 -230 .07
2 " 8893 2.96 119 .03 -210 .07
3 " 9549 2.86 126 .03 -226 .06
4 " 5870 1.76 74 .02 -138 .04
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIM.3. CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 6293 9.9 98 .15 -134 .21
2 15216 13.7 236 .21 -338 .30
3 22374 15.2 347 .23 -502 .34
4 30911 17.3 480 .26 -700 .39
5 36407 17.4 565 .27 -825 .39
6 50781 20.7 789 .32 -1165 .47
7 61314 21.3 952 .33 -1409 .49
8 82765 24.4 1285 .37 -1917 .56
9 108632 26.0 1688 .40 -2522 .60
10 186146 27.0 2890 .42 -4317 .62
Retired 31188 16.3 486 .25 -700 .36
0 Children 63510 22.8 983 .35 -1463 .52
1 " 73794 24.5 1145 .38 -1709 .56
2 " 75047 25.0 1168 .38 -1739 .58
3 " 68838 20.6 1074 .32 -1575 .47
4 " 73446 22.0 1152 .34 -1693 .50
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIMA. FUEL FOR DOMESTIC USE.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 6404 10.9 120 .19 -138 .21
2 8394 7.6 168 .14 -175 .15
3 9418 6.4 188 .12 -191 .13
4 10665 5.9 214 .12 -215 .12
5 11343 5.4 231 .11 -225 .10
6 12432 5.0 254 .10 -244 .10
7 12606 4.3 264 .09 -240 .08
8 13760 4.0 290 .08 -258 .07
9 15847 3.8 333 .05 -294 .07
10 18389 2.6 403 .10 -302 .04
Retired 10338 5.4 209 .09 -205 .10
0 Children 12073 4.3 251 .09 -230 .08
i " 13165 4.3 271 .08 -252 .08
2 ’ 12370 4.1 257 .07 -233 .07
3 ” 11978 3.5 255 .07 -214 .06
4 H 12305 3.7 264 .07 -219 .06
N.B. Reform 1 changes 6% for 9% and 
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
12% for 14%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIM.5. HOUSEHOLD NON DURABLE GOODS.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 2738 4.31 49 .07 -73 .11
2 4143 3.75 74 .06 -112 .10
3 5865 4.00 101 .06 -162 .11
4 8789 4.92 146 .08 -241 .13
5 9143 4.37 151 .07 -256 .12
6 9055 3.70 148 .06 -259 .10
7 10732 3.74 173 .06 -308 .10
8 13765 4.06 218 .06 -396 .11
9 19326 4.63 300 .07 -544 .13
10 34371 4.99 514 .07 -962 .13
Retired 8139 4.26 135 .07 -226 .11
0 Children 10654 3.83 172 .06 -304 .10
1 " 12663 4.21 199 .06 -360 .12
2 " 15779 5.26 243 .08 -437 .14
3 " 22270 6.68 338 .10 -604 .18
4 " 15413 4.63 230 .06 -438 .13
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIM.6. PUBLIC TRANSPORT.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
i 863 1.36 40 .06 18 .02
2 2246 2.03 89 .08 48 .04
3 3686 2.51 *AT 35 .09 79 .05
4 3494 1.95 138 .07 72 .04
5 4599 2.19 174 .08 97 .04
6 5821 2.38 214 .08 117 .04
7 4666 1.62 194 .06 81 .02
8 5948 1.75 238 .07 104 .03
9 9708 2.32 352 .08 187 .04
10 14369 2.08 526 .07 261 .03
Retired 3397 1.77 135 .07 65 .03
0 Children 7231 2.60 255 .09 143 .05
1 " 6021 2.00 231 .07 112 .03
2 ” 4373 1.45 189 .06 81 .02
3 " 5336 1.60 223 .06 95 .02
4 " 4558 1.37 206 .06 86 .02
N.B. Reform 1 changes 6% for 9% and 12% for 14%.
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 




























































































TABLE SIM.7. OTHER NON DURABLE GOODS.
Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure Share A tax % total A tax % total
1 5139 8.10 52 .08 -137 .21
2 9055 8.21 89 .08 -245 .22
3 14182 9.68 151 .10 -378 .25
4 17427 9.77 190 .10 -461 .25
5 22597 10.80 255 .12 -595 .28
6 27698 11.34 324 .13 -722 .29
7 38128 13.30 472 .16 -983 .34
8 44712 13.20 555 .16 -1149 .33
9 62097 14.90 808 .19 -1580 .37
10 160665 23.34 2287 .33 -4086 .58
Retired 32518 17.02 421 .22 -831 .43
0 Children 44210 15.90 574 .20 -1127 .40
1 " 39743 13.23 502 .16 -1020 .33
2 " 39747 13.25 509 .17 -1018 .33
3 ” 53937 16.20 720 .21 -1375 .41
4 " 35061 10.54 426 .12 -914 .27
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.
Increment of tax column shows the increase in tax with respect to the pre reform situation. 





























































































Initial pattern REFORM 1 REFORM 2
Decile Expenditure E.G. % total E.G. % total
i 63413 -2204 3.47 -1966 3.10
2 110291 -3786 3.47 -3301 2.99
3 146406 -4997 3.43 -4308 2.94
4 178310 -6051 3.41 -5155 2.89
5 209101 -7076 3.39 -5998 2.86
6 244210 -8236 3.38 -6932 2.83
7 286644 -9628 3.37 -8035 2.80
8 338690 -11320 3.35 -9357 2.76
9 416672 -13834 3.34 -11259 2.70
10 688119 -22375 3.32 -17369 2.52
Retired 191028 -6378 3.25 -5244 2.74
0 Children 277894 -9247 3.33 -7595 2.73
1 " 300185 -10046 3.32 -8328 2.77
2 " 299909 -10011 3.34 -8205 2.73
3 " 332897 -11115 3.33 -9177 2.75
4 " 332530 -11250 3.38 -9394 2.82
Reform 2 sets all rates at 9%.
Simulations carried out with rank 2 model 
Decile breakdown is by expenditure.





























































































In the case of food, we observe how the poorest households 
(throughout this section, we shall use the adjective "poor" and 
"rich" for those households at the bottom and top of the 
expenditure distribution respectively) have a share nearly double 
of that of the richest households. The presence of children does 
not seem to push the share up substantially unless there are four 
or more. Retired households have a share similar to households 
within the seventh expenditure decile. This pattern of 
expenditures suggests that any tax on this category is likely to 
be regressive in the sense that poor households will end up 
paying a higher percentage of their total expenditure than rich 
households. This is confirmed by the increase in payments 
forecast. The latter ranges between 1039 and 6691 pts. per 
quarter and between 1.63% and .97% of total expenditure. Thus 
poor would households would pay 66% more on food tax than rich 
households with respect to their total expenditures. The second 
reform offers similar results in terms of the distribution of 
payments but the amount is slightly increased.
In the case of alcohol, the share increases with total 
expenditure across the first 50% of its distribution but the 
variation in percentage is very small. This leads the increase in 
tax to represent a nearly constant percentage of total 
expenditure. This increase, however, ranges from 25 to 291 pts. 
per quarter. The second reform implies a fall in tax payments.
The category clothing and footwear is clearly a luxury: the 
average share rises from 10% in the first decile to 30% in the 
top one. This means that the effect of the tax is progressive, as 
the simulation results show for both reforms. For instance, if 
the first reform were implemented, the top decile would be paying 
.4% more of its expenditure on tax than the poorest one, whereas 
the second reform would lead to a saving of .6% of total 
expenditure.
Fuel is again a case of a clear necessity with respect to 
total expenditure. The share falls 8 percentage points from the 
lowest to the highest decile. Retired households have a higher 
share too (equal to that of the fifth decile) . This implies 
regressiveness in the pattern of tax payments.
Expenditure on household non-durable goods is observed to 
vary between 3.75% and 5% of the total, consequently, the 
resulting tax payments represent a nearly constant percentage for 
all expenditure deciles.
Public transport is similar to household non-durable goods 
in that the average share does not change substantially across 
the different groups.
The rest of non-durable goods are a luxury: their share 
moves from 8% to 23% as total expenditure rises. Such a pattern 
results in a progression in the increase of tax payments for the 
two simulated reforms.
Summarising, it is clear that increases in VAT will have a 
regressive effect on food and fuel, a progressive effect on 
clothing and the residual category and a roughly "neutral" effect 




























































































With respect to welfare effects, the last table of the 
series shows the money metric welfare change associated with the 
two reforms. As we can tell from the table, the equivalent gain 
associated with the first reform ranges between -2204 and -22375 
pts per quarter but in terms of percentage out of total 
expenditure, it stands between 3.25% and 3.5%. Therefore the 
reform cannot be said to be either progressive or regressive. 
Concerning reform 2, the main point to comment upon is that it 
does not improve the welfare of any household while it generates 
approximately the same revenue for the Exchequer.
Finally, revenue simulation is carried out by calculating 
every household's tax payment before and after the reform and 
then grossing it up. The I.N.E. calculates a grossing-up factor 
with each observation. Each Autonomous Community is divided into 
three "zones" (except Madrid and Cataluna with four zones and 
Ceuta-Melilla with one zone) according to the size of township 
for which the actual population size is known from Census 
information. The factor is then computed as the ratio between 
population size and sample size for each "zone". There are thus 
51 different grossing-up factors each quarter. It is important 
whether these factors have been calculated before or after 
sampling because an unequal rate of response is reported both 
across regions and socio-economic characteristics in all quarters 
from 1985 to 1989. The manual is not clear about such issue but 
judging by the introductory foreword, we would come to the 
conclusion that no adjustment has been done:
"Despite the resources applied in order to facilitate 
household collaboration (...), it has been impossible 
to avoid refusals; which, firstly, have not affected 
different Autonomous Communities in the same way and, 
secondly, have not followed an uniform pattern across 
socioeconomic strata, therefore the publication of 
results a the Autonomous Community level is 
impossible.."
It would then be desirable to correct for such differential 
non-response. Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) suggest possible 
ways to do so. For instance, a re-weighing of the grossing-up 
factor to account for the missing households in each region would 
be appropriate in our case. Despite our efforts, however, 
Autonomous Community information is not supplied within the 
tapes.
In these circumstances, a range of alternatives would be 
possible. Firstly, since the manual provides separate information 
on non response by number of members in the household and 
education level of the head of household, the supplied factors 
could be re-weighted by groups of these two variables (this is 
done for age groups in the F.E.S. by Atkinson and Micklewright 
[ibid]).
Secondly, Atkinson et al. (1988) propose to obtain grossing-up 
factors by solving a system of linear equations linking household 
characteristics in the sample to their counterparts in the 
population. Since no unique solution is obtained from this 




























































































For this research we use the supplied weights without 
adjustment. This is due in part to its preliminary nature but 
most of all to the impression that it might be worth waiting for 
future editions of the E.C.P.F. supplying geographical 
information so that adequate weighing by region jointly with 
other demographic characteristics can be done. Given this, we do 
not adjust for changes in the structure of the population from 
the last quarter of 1989 to the current date either. Further 
research will seek to solve this problem in a satisfactory 
manner.
Finally, a last warning should be issued in the sense that 
even if we had the correct grossing-up factors, the forecast 
figures would be still be subject to departures from other 
forecasts due to the so called non-sampling errors. These may 
arise because of wrong coding, erroneous answers and, above all, 
the tendency to conceal certain types of expenditures which has 
been detected in other budget surveys such as the F.E.S. In 
addition such surveys do not include institutional consumers.
With these caveats in mind, we present our aggregated 
figures in the following table. All figures are in millions of 
1989 pesetas.




























































































TABLE 5. FORECASTS OF REVENUE CHANGES TO REFORMS 1 AND 2.
CATEGORY PRE-REFORM REFORM 1 REFORM 2





















TOTAL 236290 297147 241034.5
N.B. Reform 1 sets reduced and standard rates at 9% and 14% 
respectively.
It is useful to recall that it is not the total of revenue 
that is important (for we have omitted a number of important 
expenditure categories which generate a lot of revenue) when 
interpreting the table. Rather, it is interesting to see the 
reaction from every single category. In this sense it is 
noteworthy that the increase in revenue accrued from food in the 
two reforms reaches 46% from an increase of three points in VAT. 
The case of alcohol shows that a move from 12% to 14% would 
increase revenue by 12%, whereas there would be a loss of 22% if 
a 9% rate was applied. The same pattern applies to clothing, 
where reform 1 would raise 14% more and reform 2 21% less. From 
household and other non-durable goods the Exchequer would also 
lose twice as much in percentage with the second reform as they 
would gain with the first . Public transport would generate 66% 
and 34% more revenue with the first and second reforms 
respectively.
There is a couple of facts that emerge from this results. 
Firstly, amongst the reduced rate goods, public transport seems 
capable of generating proportionally more revenue than food, but 
only if all taxes increase together. Thus the application of a 
single rate would shift the burden towards food, which is a 
necessity. Not surprisingly the reform does not improve the 
welfare of households, as mentioned before. Secondly, amongst the 
standard rate goods, the one with the highest capacity for 




























































































housing, which not surprisingly is a necessity and has a low own 
price elasticity too. This is followed by clothing and household 
non-durable goods, which are classed as luxuries and accordingly 
could be used as a revenue generating instrument with a 





























































































We have estimated a complete flexible demand system on 
microdata and then used it to carry out indirect tax simulations. 
In our opinion the system could still be improved in terms of 
price parameters significance only if we had counted with more 
years of microdata and thus more relative price variation. More 
experiments with rank three specifications could also improve the 
information about the nature of some categories of consumption. 
Another field in which further research will yield improvements 
for the modelling exercise is the inclusion of tobacco and 
petrol, which bear special taxes and, given suitable modelling, 
durable goods.
However, the current system results are the first of their 
kind for Spain and provide a good starting point on which to 
build up progressively more sophisticated versions.
Concerning the performance of the current model, the results seem 
to confirm the a priori ideas we had in terms of sign and size of 
own-price and expenditure elasticities for the majority of 
categories and therefore serve as a good simulation basis too. 
Thus we are able to obtain predictions of the increment in tax 
that households would have to pay and moreover, this is done at 
the individual level. The implications for the assessment of 
different tax policies on welfare grounds is that a detailed 
monitoring of who are the losers and the winners in a particular 
fiscal measure can be done.
The two tax reforms we have simulated do not show a clear 
bias towards either regressiveness or progressiveness in terms of 
percentage of tax payments out of total expenditure; however, 
with respect to individual categories, such patterns have been 
identified unambiguously. The exercise also produces a good 
picture of the capacity that each commodity has as a revenue 
generating instrument and, again, this takes into account the 
behaviour of households.
Our view, thus, is that this exercise increases its 
usefulness when its results are compared with other predictions, 
be it from time series or any other forecast instrument. 
Consequently it may turn out to be an interesting aid in 




























































































APPENDIX 1. Data Sources.
The data we use for the estimation of the demand system is 
a pool of two microdata surveys, the "Encuesta de Presupuestos 
Familiares" (EPF) and the "Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos 
Familiares" (ECPF) both organised by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica (see I.N.E. 1985).
The first of these surveys is run every 10 years and we use 
the 1980 edition. Its contribution to the estimating sample is 
2000 households. The ECPF has been carried out quarterly since 
January 1985. Its sample of 3200 households is renewed in a 12% 
every quarter so in order to preserve independence, the set of 
new households entering the survey for the first time each 
quarter are the contribution to our estimating sample.
Next we describe the sampling structure and nature of 
collected information, which is common to both surveys. The 
sample has been obtained through a two-stage process of 
stratification, which leads to an independent sample for each 
Autonomous Community thereby representing the whole nation. At a 
first stage, the total of 32,000 electoral constituencies into 
which Spain is divided are classified into different strata 
according to size of township. These strata are further 
sub-divided according to the proportion of active population that 
falls within three different groups of activity. Subsequently, 
584 constituencies are chosen from such classification in a 
manner proportional to the concentration of population but 
containing a minimum of 85 households from each Autonomous 
Community. From each of those constituencies contributes with a 
fixed number of households is drawn randomly.
With respect to the collection of information, there are 4 
basic questionnaires (the two surveys are identical in this 
sense) :
1. Household Accounts. This is filled by the person in 
charge of running the house (generally the housewife). It 
contains all expenditure (on goods and services to be consumed by 
either the housewife or the household in general) made by the 
housewife during the sample week (day by day).
2. Individual Expenditures. One of these is filled 
separately by each member of the household over fourteen years 
of age except the housewife. It collects all expenditure (on 
goods and services to be consumed by either this member or the 
household as a whole) made during the sample week (day by day).
3. Expenditure of Monthly or Quarterly Reference. This is 
filled by the I.N.E. agent during an interview with members of 
the household. It collects expenditure on goods whose reference 
period is either a month or a quarter.
4. Household General Data. This is filled by the I.N.E. 
agent during an interview with members of the household. It 
collects all demographic information and the (net) income of each 




























































































The households used for both welfare and revenue simulation 
are those which make up the last quarter of 1989. Every household 
has a grossing up factor which indica( the number of households 
which it theoretically represents in the whole of the nation and 




























































































A problem commonly faced when estimating a demand system 
with flexible price responses from microdata is that of 
insufficient variation in relative prices. This is crucial, 
because if there is a high degree of multi-collinearity in price 
series, we cannot expect to identify separately own- and 
cross-price effects and the resulting parameters will generally 
display large standard errors. Our previous experience was that 
an A.I.M. cannot be estimated out of the E.C.P.F. data for the 
period 1985-89, hence our study for a Linear Expenditure System 
(Labeaga and Lopez, 1992).
In these circumstances, we have examined the nature of the 
variation in prices in Spain during the period 1980-89 with a 
view to assessing the convenience of adding extra price variation 
by means of pooling the E.C.P.F. data with E.P.F. data for 1980. 
We find that a substantial increase in relative price variation 
is obtained this way with respect to the period 1985-89. However, 
a high degree of collinearity is still present in the series so 
the results for our system in terms of significance of price 
parameters are not very surprising.
The analysis is carried out for twenty price series rather 
that just the seven series used in estimation. Our intention when 
doing so was to obtain evidence on which categories could be 
either aggregated or kept apart in order to avoid close 
correlations and exploit independent variation. As we will see 
our results do not suggest any of these.
All prices (quarterly series) have been obtained from the 
official publications of the I.N.E. "Indice de precios al 
consumo". Since it is relative price variation that matters when 
estimating a demand system (the effects of nominal general 
increases are collected by the real income terms), we express all 
series relative to one common category and we perform a principal 
component analysis.




























































































The use of principal components analysis in the context of 
multivariate regression is justified when there is a high degree 
of collinearity amongst variables in order to detect which of 
these can be ignored without loss of information or which linear 
combination(s ) can provide a good summary of the variability in 
the data.
Principal components are derived from either the correlation 
or the covariance matrix of a set of variables. Formally, let C 
be the correlation matrix of a data matrix X containing n
variables, the i : principal component of C is defined as the
following linear combination
zi y.±X; 
i = 1 . • -n;
where X1 is the eigen vector of each of the n eigen values of 
C (see e.g. Manly, 1986).
By construction, principal components are orthogonal to each 
other and are defined in a way such that the variance of each of 
the principal components corresponds to its eigen value which in 
turn add up to the trace of C, therefore principal components can 
be said to account for all the variation in the original data.
The practical implication is that by examining which 
principal components are important in explaining total variance, 
we know what variable or (linear combination of variables) offers 
independent information simply by looking at its contribution to 
the principal component. In technical terms this is known as the
loading of the k ch variable on the i c o m p o n e n t  and from the 
definition above it is easy to see that this is given by the 
k zr- element of . By the same token, the variables loading
high on irrelevant principal components are revealed to 
contribute little to total variance. The threshold above which 
principal components are considered important is 6% of total 
variance, which can be shown to be equivalent to displaying an 
eigenvalue above the unit. It should be clear thus that if our 
twenty price variables are all orthogonal then we should get 
twenty important principal components and, at the other extreme, 
if only one variable is independent then only one component will 
be so.
APP2.1. Principal component analysis.
We have examined two different time spans, that of the 
E.C.P.F. (1985-89) and the whole decade of the eighties (1980- 
89). The results for the first span show three important 
components (on the criterion that their eigenvalue should be 




























































































span, where four principal components can be considered important 





























































































TABLE APP2.1. Principal component analysis. Variance 
explained by each of the four significant components and 
corresponding individual loadings.
Eigen value
# 1 #2 #3 #4
Variance 12.008 4.36 1.32 1.07
Cumulative 60% 21.8% 6.6% 5.3%
Loadings 60% 81.8% 88.4% 93.8%
Food .74 .17 -.40 .36
Alcohol .92 -.12 -.22 .17
Tobacco .45 .10 -.17 .30
Clothing .90 -.30 .16 .002
Housing .72 .45 -.29 .15
Fuel -.84 .04 .39 -.05
N.W. durable .86 .43 -.03 .01
W. durable .76 .48 -.27 .22
Medicines .19 -.08 -.13 .95
Hshld n.d. .74 .18 -.40 .30
Vehicles .59 .67 -.17 .12
Petrol .08 .94 -.11 .09
P . transport -.48 -.79 .30 -.013
Telecomm. -.10 .61 .13 -.08
Leisure d. .62 .64 -.27 .24
Leisure n.d. .84 .16 -.23 .13
Education .72 .56 -.28 .17
P. care -.35 -.23 .86 -.17
Holidays .24 -.35 -.29 .20
Meals out -.02 -.25 .19 .07
N.B. The following abbreviations are used:
N.W./ W. Durables= Non-white/ White durable goods.
Hshld n. d. = Household non-durable goods.
P. transport= Public transport.
Telecomm.telecommunications.
Leisure d./ n.d.= Leisure durable and non-durable goods. 




























































































As we can see, the first factor loads mainly from alcohol, 
clothing, fuel, non-white durable goods, leisure non-durable 
goods and then food, housing, white durable and so on. The second 
component is driven by petrol, and marginally by public 
transport. The third draws from personal care and the fourth from 
medicines.
This results are interesting in that they highlight the 
impossibility of choosing aggregate categories with independent 
variation in a manner corresponding to any a priori ideas we 
might have on consumer behaviour. That is, these principal 
components results would guarantee that if we lump all the goods 
contributing to the first component into one single equation and 
do likewise with the rest of components (obtaining thus four 
estimating equations), then the corresponding price regressors 
(constructed by means of some index) would not be very 
correlated. However, this procedure is of little use to our 
exercise since we are not modelling any of the durable 
categories, or petrol, which seems to be the responsible for the 
variance explained by the second component. Likewise, the last 
two components are driven by categories of little interest for 
this exercise or at least, in the case of medicines, they would 
deserve separate treatment in terms of modelling. But more 
importantly, it turns out that our main goods of interest: food, 
alcohol, clothing and fuel all contribute to the same principal 
component and this procedure would not yield separate price 
estimates for each one.
This is confirmed by graphic AP2.1. We have plotted the 
relative prices of the estimating categories food, alcohol, 
clothing, fuel, household non-durable goods and public transport 
and also petrol. All prices appear to move closely together, 
except for petrol, which loads on the second factor. This is 
reassuring for future work in the sense that there is a minimum 
guarantee that once included in a demand system, we may obtain 
estimates of cross-elasticities with public transport and other 
goods of policy interest.
In conclusion our results do not offer any clear-cut way to 
group categories and such grouping has to be done in conformance 
with other criteria. They suggest that some gain can be obtained 
from pooling the E.C.P.F. data with data from its twin survey 
from 1980. However, the main conclusion we might draw from this 
analysis is that price parameters in our demand system are likely 
to lack statistical significance and that this is due to a great 
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